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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Kenner appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
retrieved from between his buttocks’ cheeks during a police officer’s warrantless roadside search
of the area between his underwear and naked buttocks.

The search was conducted while

Mr. Kenner was standing on a public roadway, following a traffic stop and his arrest.
Mr. Kenner contends that the search exceeded the permissible scope of the search incident to
arrest, and was not justified by exigent circumstances. He also asserts that, although he was on
parole at the time, the State failed to establish, and the district court declined to find, that he had
consented to the search when he entered into his parole supervision agreement. Mr. Kenner
claims that, even if the police had justification for a strip search, conducting such a search on a
public roadway was unjustified and constitutionally unreasonable given the absence of exigent
circumstances. He further urges the adoption of a bright-line rule against the police conducting
non-exigent strip searches in public places.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Kenner’s Appellant’s Brief, pp.1-6, and are incorporated herein by reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kenner’s motion to suppress evidence?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kenner’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The central issue in this case is whether a police officer may, incident to an arrest,

conduct a public strip search for suspected contraband in the absence of exigent circumstances.
Mr. Kenner claims the search in his case was constitutionally unreasonable. Although the police
had legal cause to arrest him, the invasiveness of the search – intentionally pulling his pants and
underwear away from his body to obtain a view of his naked buttocks, and then reaching in to
that area in search of possible drugs – exceeded the scope of permissible search incident to
arrest, and was not otherwise justified by the circumstances.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s opposition to a requirement of
individualized exigency to conduct a public strip search, and to show that, contrary to the State’s
claim, the State failed in its burden of demonstrating that Mr. Kenner consented to the strip
search via his parole supervision agreement.

B.

The Police Officer’s Reach-In Strip Search Was Constitutionally Unreasonable Because
It Exceeded The Permissible Scope Of A Search Incident To Arrest And Was Not
Justified By Individualized Exigent Circumstances
The State argues that the police officer’s warrantless search – viewing and reaching in

between Mr. Kenner’s underwear and his naked buttocks – was “an entirely reasonable search
given Mr. Kenner’s decision to hide the contraband in his buttocks.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.6.)
However, that is not the Fourth Amendment standard. As stated in Appellant’s Brief, at page 9,
a warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls into one of the specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 647
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(2017). The exception relied upon by the district court when it denied Mr. Kenner’s motion to
suppress was the search incident to arrest exception. (R., p.252.) As noted by the district court,
and by Mr. Kenner in his Appellant’s Brief, the Idaho Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of
the United States have never approved of strip searches incident to arrest.

(R., p.252;

Appellant’s Brief, p.5, (citing Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (cautioning that the
Court was not now and had not previously considered “the circumstances in which a strip search
of an arrestee may or may not be appropriate”), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769
(1966) (holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits bodily intrusions that “are not justified in
the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner”).)
1.

A Reach-In Strip Search Is Distinct From The Routine Searches Permitted
Automatically As A Search Incident To Arrest And Must Be Justified By
Individualized Suspicion And Individualized Exigency

Contrary to the State’s argument (Respondent’s Brief, p.14), the distinction of a search as
a “strip search” is not mere “semantics”; the distinction has significance under Fourth
Amendment doctrine. A search of an arrestee’s clothing has been deemed constitutionally
reasonable, and permissible automatically, and requires no individualized suspicion or
individualized exigency. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); State v. Lee, 162 Idaho
642 (2017); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).

However, as noted in

Appellant’s Brief, at page 11, a police officer’s search of an arrestee’s naked, private areas
beneath his (or her) underwear has not been deemed a permissible search incident to arrest, and
has and should require individualized justification. (Appellant’s Brief, p.11, citing Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769 (1966).) Thus,
to meet its burden of demonstrating a strip search incident to arrest was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, the State must demonstrate both individualized suspicion and individualized
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exigency. Mr. Kenner does not dispute the police had an individualized suspicion that he was
concealing drugs beneath his underwear; rather, his claim is that the warrantless, public strip
search conducted incident to his arrest was unreasonable because individualized exigency was
lacking. (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-14.) Although the officers had observed Mr. Kenner’s
attempts to reach into the back of his pants, they were able to prevent him from doing so while
he was handcuffed and under their supervision. (Tr., p.65, L.6 – p.66, L.4.) Additionally, there
were multiple officers – eight to ten – at the scene who could have facilitated removing
Mr. Kenner from the public street without risking destruction of the evidence. (Tr., p.63, Ls.2425, p.68, L.14.)
2.

Idaho’s Courts Have Never Approved Of An Officer’s Search Inside An
Arrestee’s Underwear As A Permissible Search Incident To Arrest

The State has cited no authority that the permissible scope of a search-incident-to-arrest
includes a search of the area between the arrestee’s underwear and his (or her) naked skin.
(Respondent’s Brief, pp.1-20.) Contrary to the State’s suggestion (Respondent’s Brief, p.9), the
Court of Appeals’ Opinion in State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346 (Ct. App. 2008), did not give
approval for an officer’s non-routine reach-in type of strip search. In Chapman, a state trooper
was told Chapman was hiding drugs “in his groin area of his pants”; “the trooper thereupon
returned to Chapman with the purpose of removing the drugs believed to be concealed in his
pants” and before placing Chapman under arrest, “loosened Chapman’s pants and removed a
plastic baggie” containing cocaine. Id., at 349 (emphasis added). Nothing in the opinion
suggests the police reached underneath Chapman’s underwear or visually or manually searched
his naked buttocks. Id. Rather, the issues presented to the Court were probable cause and
timing: whether the police had probable cause to arrest Chapman before searching his clothing,
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and whether the fact Chapman was arrested after that search precluded a valid search-incidentto-arrest. Id. The intensity of the intrusion was not at issue in that case.
3.

A Public Strip Search Must Be Justified By Individualized Exigency To Be
Constitutionally Reasonable

The State opposes a requirement of individualized exigency to conduct a public strip
search. (Respondent’s Brief, pp.14-15.) However, the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of
reasonableness demands nothing less. Contrary to the State’s assertion (Respondent’s Brief,
p.9), a clear rule that forbids police officers from conducting non-exigent strip searches in public
places does not require that officers turn a blind eye to evidence they believe the arrestee is
concealing.

Law enforcement may seek a search warrant, or deliver the arrestee to the

stationhouse for a search upon booking, or remove the arrestee to an appropriate private location
for search. Because an arrestee is already in police custody and under police supervision, he or
she may be placed under the very watchful eyes of officers who believe evidence has been
hidden. “The mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself
justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348 (2009)
(quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)).
The State argues that the constitutional reasonableness of a given strip search in public
should be subjected to a case-by-case evaluation and balancing of multiple factors, as was done
in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), and Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013).
(Respondent’s Brief, pp.8, 15.) However, those cases dealt with suspicionless searches of
classes of detainees and inmates. Wolfish, at 559 (evaluating Bureau of Prison’s administrative
orders for systematic strip searches at detention facilities); King, at 448 (evaluating a Maryland
state law requiring DNA searches of all arrestees charged with violent offenses). Wolfish and
King do not provide the legal test for a pubic strip search conducted incident to an arrest.
6

The relevant1 justification for a contemporaneous search-incident-to arrest is stated in
Chimel – “to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction.” 395 U.S. at 763. Where that search is a strip search, constitutional
reasonableness requires there be an individualized showing of suspicion and exigency. The wide
variety of the fact patterns presented by the strip-search cases cited in the parties’ briefing
illustrates the invasions of privacy that can occur when police suspect contraband is being
concealed in an arrestee’s buttocks, rectum, bra, or vagina. (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.12-13;
Respondent’s Brief, p.14, fn.3).

Under the Fourth Amendment, no strip search should be

permitted in a public place unless the destruction of the suspected evidence appears imminent.
There was no such exigency in Mr. Kenner’s case, and the public strip search was therefore
unreasonable, in violation of Mr. Kenner’s Fourth Amendment rights.
4.

The State Failed To Argue Or Establish, And The District Court Declined To
Find, That Mr. Kenner Consented To The Public Strip Search Via The Provisions
Of His Parole Agreement

Contrary to the State’s assertion (Respondent’s Brief, p.18), the officer’s search inside
Mr. Kenner’s underwear cannot be justified under the consent provisions of Mr. Kenner’s parole
agreement. The State failed to argue or establish that the consent provisions of Mr. Kenner’s
parole supervision agreement encompassed a strip search, let alone a public strip search. To the
contrary, in its written decision the district court found that Mr. Kenner “had a reasonable
expectation

of

privacy

in

his

1

pants

and

underwear”

Chimel’s other justification, “to remove any weapons,” is not relevant to the strip search; as
noted in Appellant’s Brief, page 2, Officer Williams had already conducted a thorough pat down
search of Mr. Kenner for any type of weapon, large and small, including checking the area
Mr. Kenner had been reaching for and around his waist area, and found none. (Tr., p.66, L.22 –
p.67, L.1.) Officer Williams testified he did not believe Mr. Kenner had a weapon after that.
(Tr., p.66, L.13 – p.67, L.1.)
7

which was not disputed by the parties. (R., p.251.) The district court’s finding is supported by
the record.

Mr. Kenner’s parole officer, Colin Widmier, testified he did not discuss strip

searches with Mr. Kenner when Mr. Kenner signed the parole agreement, and that to his
knowledge the Department of Probation and Parole had no policy regarding strip searches; the
probation officer also testified that he personally had never conducted one. (Tr., p.14, Ls.1116.).
The State’s only “waiver” argument, which is contained in its written reply and closing
brief filed in the district court, was that Mr. Kenner “had waived certain constitutional
protections regarding warrantless searches when he pled guilty to two prior felonies.” (R., p.232
(emphasis added).) Even if the State’s remarks and evidence are construed as an argument that
Mr. Kenner had consented to public strip search by agreeing to the parole terms, the district court
implicitly rejected that argument when it found that Mr. Kenner had a reasonable expectation of
privacy which was not in dispute. (R., p.251.) The State has therefore failed in its burden to
establish that Mr. Kenner consented to the reach-in strip search when he agreed to the terms of
his parole.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Kenner
respectfully requests that this Court reversed the district court’s denial of his suppression motion,
vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand his case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 13th day of March, 2018.
__________/s/_______________
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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